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In CNBC’s ‘India Tonight’ programme broadcast on April 30, Karan Thapar presented an interview with Lieutenant-General J.F.R. Jacob, who was Chief of Staff of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command during the Bangladesh campaign of 1971, and who was after his retirement Governor of Goa and Governor of Punjab, in the context of the Government’s decision to give Field Marshal S.H.F.J. Manekshaw back pay for the period since his retirement from service over 36 years ago. There is a particular focus here on his role, as well as General Jacob’s role, in the Bangladesh campaign. This is an edited but substantially intact version of the transcript provided by CNBC:
Lieutenant General A.A.K. 'Tiger' Niazi, Commander of the Pakistan Army in the East, signs the Instrument of Surrender in the presence of Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora. Standing from left is Vice Admiral N. Krishnan, Air Marshal H.C. Dewan, Lieutenant General Sagat Singh and Major General J.F.R. Jacob.
Karan Thapar: Recently the Government gave Field Marshal Manekshaw a cheque for Rs. 1.6 crore in lieu of the salary he should have received as Field Marshal but didn’t get over the last 36 years. You have worked very closely with him. In 1971 when he was made Field Marshal, was he treated fairly or shabbily?
General Jacob: I think the Government was less than generous. He went out on a pension of Rs. 1,300 — that was Rs. 100 more than [that of] the Chief [of the Army Staff]. And no perks whatsoever, no car, nothing.
Karan: You met him a few days after his retirement. You called on him at the MES Inspection Bungalow. How did you find him?
Gen. Jacob: I found him sitting there dejected and looking very lonely. I asked him what the problem was, and he told me he had just returned after meeting Mrs. Gandhi and that he had asked to be made Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, which she declined. Instead she offered him the high commissionership in one of the Commonwealth countries, and he was very upset.
Karan: He was upset at being refused the Deputy Chairmanship. Did he explain why he wanted the Deputy Chairmanship?
Gen. Jacob: No, he didn’t explain it. But I pre-assume that he thought he would be able to do it. It’s an important job.
Karan: And it was the job he had set his heart on.
Gen. Jacob: Yes.
Karan: In fact, when Manekshaw visited Calcutta after retirement — by then you were the Army Commander in Calcutta — he didn’t even have a car and you put one at his disposal. But Jagjivan Ram, Defence Minister, ticked you off for that.
Gen. Jacob: Yes, he did. He said, why [are] you giving him a car he is not authorised [to use] as a Field Marshal? So I told him, look I am not giving him a car because he is Field Marshal; this is a courtesy I extend to all ex-Army Commanders of the Eastern Command.
Karan: But the Defence Minister of the day didn’t like the idea?
Gen. Jacob: No.
Karan: Your association with Manekshaw goes back to 1950 when he was a Brigadier and DMO [Director of Military Operations] and you were a Major attached to General Staff in Delhi. He used to consult you a lot in those days, didn’t he?
Gen. Jacob: Yes, I used to go fairly often to his house. He was generous and hospitable to me and he used to discuss matters with me. You see, Sam unfortunately had a very short experience of war. He was wounded in the early stages of war; unfortunately he was not able to command a battalion, so he used to call me in for discussions.
Karan: So in a sense he had a short experience of war and he never commanded a battalion in his entire career.
Gen. Jacob: That’s correct.
Karan: Which meant those were little bits of disadvantages for him as a DMO. In contrast, you had done full five years in the Second World War, he needed your advice.
Gen. Jacob: Well, I don’t know [if] he needed [it] or not, but he used to ask for it.
Karan: In an interview in 1999, Manekshaw told me that he won a Military Cross almost at the beginning of the Second World War; a certain General Cowan took the unusual step of pinning the medal on him on the battlefield itself.
Gen. Jacob: Well, I don’t know about that: no one wears medals at war. But Sam deserved it: he was courageous and got an active gallantry [award]. But the question of anyone pinning on a medal… no one wears medals in war. I think it is Sam’s over-exuberance.
Karan: That’s a bit of an exaggeration.
Gen. Jacob: Well, call that…
Karan: You next served with Manekshaw in 1961. He was at that time the Commandant of the Staff College at Wellington and you were a member of the teaching staff. At the time Manekshaw was accused of anti-national activities and a court of inquiry was appointed to investigate the matter. And you were asked to give evidence. Is that right?
Gen. Jacob: That’s correct, I was rung up by General Kaul, offered anything if I gave evidence. I refused to give evidence. It’s not my wont and my character to give evidence against my boss. I refused.
Karan: But were you, in refusing to give evidence, protecting Manekshaw?
Gen. Jacob: I consider that is not done for me to give evidence against my boss. Had I done so, it would have caused difficulties for Manekshaw.
Karan: Had you given evidence, you could have caused difficulties for Manekshaw?
Gen. Jacob: I said it could have caused.
Karan: In other words, you are saying had you given evidence, had you spoken about things you knew of — instead of being exonerated as Manekshaw was, he could have been found guilty?
Gen. Jacob: I don’t think so. All I can say is, he might have created some problem.
Karan: At the time, if I recall correctly, the speculation was that Manekshaw had the habit of talking loosely. People say that he would go around referring to Indians dismissively as natives and that in public frequently, sitting at Wellington Club, he would criticise politicians like V.K. Krishna Menon, or General Kaul. If I recall correctly, you were honorary secretary of the Wellington Club. Was there some credibility to these stories?
Gen. Jacob: I can’t comment on that.
Karan: You can’t comment?
Gen. Jacob: No.
Karan: But you won’t deny them either.
Gen. Jacob: I won’t comment.
Karan: That’s very significant. You won’t comment, but you won’t deny them.
Let’s come to the 1971 war, for which Manekshaw is best known. At that time you were Chief of Staff, Eastern Command. It is widely believed that Manekshaw stood up to pressure from politicians and as a result military action was delayed from April 1971 to December. But that’s not the real truth, is it?
Gen. Jacob: Well, put [it] this way, he did ring me three times in early April to move to Bangladesh. I refused, I gave him reasons.
Karan: He rang you three times wanting the Army to move to Bangladesh?
Gen. Jacob: I gave him reasons why we couldn’t move.
Karan: I will soon ask you what your reasons were, but he wasn’t happy with your refusal?
Gen. Jacob: No.
Karan: He got irritated?
Gen. Jacob: Yes.
Karan: Now, you refused to move in. What exactly were the reasons you gave Manekshaw?
Gen. Jacob: I told him, look, we are mountain divisions. We don’t have a single bridge. There are large numbers of rivers between us to cross. We don’t have transport. The monsoon is about to break. And international penal [action] will not let you move. So these are the reasons we cannot move. I told him: [I’m] afraid it’s not possible at this stage.
Karan: Two things: first of all, the reasons you had — and obviously they were good reasons — for not moving in April were reasons he had never thought of or appreciated as the Army chief.
Gen. Jacob: I can’t comment on what he thought.
Karan: But clearly that follows that he was pushing you to move in, he rung you three times, were irritated by your refusal.
Gen. Jacob: But his people in Delhi pushed him.
Karan: Secondly, you also pointed out to him that if the Army moved in April, it would have been disastrous?
Gen. Jacob: Yes, it would have been, because we [would have] got bogged down.
Karan: So the truth is, people say Manekshaw stood up to political pressure and delayed military action from April to December. The full truth is that he did this because the Eastern Command stood up to him on three separate occasions, otherwise he might have agreed to the pressure he was under.
Gen. Jacob: Yes, maybe after he got our advice he went to the Cabinet and told them 窶朗o.窶劬
Karan: Let’s now come to the war plan under which India fought the war. As Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, you sent your version of the plan to Delhi in May. What was the strategy that plan was based upon?
Gen. Jacob: We assessed that to win a war we had to take Dhaka. Dhaka was the geo-strategic heart of East Pakistan. No campaign would have been complete without it.
Karan: So the core of your war plan was the taking of Dhaka?
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